DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 31, 1976

No. 405

PANEL DISCUSSION WITH
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
MEMBERS OF
THE WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF PHILADELPHIA
AUGUST 31, 1976

MR. BODINE: Ladies and gentlemen, good evening. I am Bill Bodine of the World Affairs Council, and it is my most enjoyable mission to initially welcome you here and to say how delighted we are to have you with us, and then in the briefest time possible to get this program underway.

In the interest of permitting the distinguished members of our media panel seated here on the stage to the right of the Secretary and you knowledgeable Philadelphians in the audience maximum time to present your questions directly to our guest of honor, the Secretary has decided to make only a brief opening statement, with no lengthy formal remarks, and then to permit us to go on to the questions.

If I may, let me very briefly explain the procedure we will follow.

While the panelists are directing questions to the Secretary, in a "Meet the Press" format over the next thirty minutes or so, will those of you in the audience who have questions please write them on the pads that have been provided at your table. Those notepapers will be collected by members of the staff of the World Affairs Council moving amongst you, and the questions will be screened so that we can eliminate the duplication and then returned to the questioner to be asked by him or her by using the standing mikes on the ballroom floor. And thus, will you kindly place your name and your table number at the top of the paper when writing your question, in order that we may get it back to the proper person.

Now for the members of the panel, very quickly, whom we assume are familiar to all or most certainly most of you. Creed C. Black, a true son of the South; a distinguished World War II military record as a combat infantryman; served as senior newspaper executive in Savannah, Wilmington and Chicago before being called to Washington as Assistant Secretary of HEW for two years. He came to Philadelphia six years ago as Vice President and Editor of the Philadelphia Inquirer, and promptly established himself as a semi-professional golfer of tenacious ability.

(Laughter and applause)

On his right is Chuck Stone, U. S. Air Force Navigator; a respected educator who has lectured widely; astute observer of international affairs as CARE Representative in Egypt, Gaza and India; and with the American Committee on Africa. He is President of the National Association of Black Journalists. He is a Board Member, I hasten to add, of the World Affairs Council, and a valued member of our Declaration of Interdependence Program Committee.

He has just been appointed in the last few days by the Washington Star as their next writer in residence for a period of eight weeks this fall. TV Talk Show Host on Channel 48, and a distinguished columnist of the Philadelphia Daily News. (Applause)

Jessica Savitch, a native of Kennet Square, not very far from where we meet this evening. She, too, has boxed the compass in her professional association with the broadcasting industry, having served in Atlantic City, Rochester, New York City, and Houston. Just four years ago, she joined KYW-TV, and by her high degree of professional skill and extremely atractive style of presentation has become firmly established as a widely admired Eye Witness news reporter and distinguished co-anchorwoman. (Applause)

And then a fighting Marine, John G. McCullough, who has been Editor of the Evening and Sunday Belletin's editorial page over the past decade. Before that, he served in his newspaper's Washington Bureau and as the paper's national political editor.

He is immediate past-President of the National Conference of Editorial Writers and is known far and wide as a fine Philadelphia gentleman. (Applause)

In mid-March of 1972, when serving as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and just after returning from the initial Presidential visit to Peking, and while preparing for the Moscow visit which would follow shortly, Dr. Kissinger appeared before our World Affairs Council for an off-the-record exchange. And you would want me to say to him on your behalf how absolutely delighted we are to have him back again. (Applause)

No American is better known to you in this audience than our guest of honor, since he has served not only our country but in fact the entire world for almost eight years at the highest levels of our national Government. It would appear unnecessary and a little ridiculous, therefore, to introduce him to you. And I thought, Mr. Secretary, rather than that, I would like to present this distinguished audience of knowledgeable Philadelphians to you, who on very short notice have turned out to pay their respects and to discuss with you some of the pressing foreign affairs problems of the day.

So, members and friends of the World Affairs Council, it is a great pleasure and a very distinct honor to introduce you to the Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger. (Applause)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the panel, ladies and gentlemen, let me say, to begin with, how glad I am to be back in Philadelphia and to express my admiration to an audience of 200, before whom I could give an off-the-record talk from which nothing leaked. I could not do that with 200 Washingtonians that have a top secret clearance. (Laughter and applause)

I am here partly to exhibit my masochism in exposing myself to the questions of this distinguished and fearsome panel that you have assembled, and secondly to tell you that we have conducted a brilliant foreign policy. (Laughter and applause)

The Chairman was kind enough to ask me to make a few brief introductory comments. He forgot that as a former professor my normal speaking time is 50 minutes, and having been brought up in the German language, I don't get to the verb until the 25th minute. (Laughter and applause)

But in order to enable the panelists to destroy me, let me quickly make a few general observations.

First, the foreign policy of a great nation is not the invention of its President or of its Secretary of State. The foreign policy of a nation is determined very importantly by the objective circumstances in which it finds itself, by the values of its people, and only to some extent by the ability of its leaders to discern these trends and to shape them for their own ends.

One therefore should not believe that foreign policy can be changed dramatically at regular intervals. Indeed, a well-considered foreign policy at some point in the nation's history must achieve some level of stability and must in its main lines be fixed.

On the other hand, there occasionally are periods of great change. And in the last eight years, the United States has undergone very important changes in the international environment in which we find ourselves.

It is not only that we had to end a war, which we found when coming into office, in a rather painful and difficult way, and that America had to adjust to this traumatic experience. It is also that the many elements in the international environment, as we have known it throughout our modern history, had radically altered.

First, this is the period in which the growth of nuclear weapons on both sides has created the unprecedented fact that there are two nations in the world that can destroy each other and destroy humanity. And therefore many of the traditional patterns of international relations, many of the risks that in the past could be run, are no longer applicable. Whoever is President will sooner or later be driven to the realization that was first expressed by President Eisenhower -- that there is no alternative to peace.

How to create a stable peace and how to control the nuclear arsenals of both sides becomes an overriding task of our diplomacy.

Throughout history, it was inconceivable that a nation could possess too much power. Almost any additional increment of power you acquired could be put to political use. We live in a period in which an upper limit of destructiveness is reached beyond which civilization, having already been destroyed, the additional accumulation of at least strategic power is no longer relevant.

What conclusions one draws from this in the field of negotiations or in the field of day-to-day diplomacy, we can perhaps discuss with the panel. I simply want to point out the new fact of international relations.

The second new fact is that for the first time in history, foreign policy has become truly global. Never before have the continents been in daily contact with each other. Never before have there been power centers in every part of the globe. And never before has it been necessary to construct an international community out of so many diverse elements.

And this is compounded by the rapidity of communications -- so that not only is policy global, reaction has to be nearly instantaneous.

Now, when one speaks of peace, one has to speak of a world which the majority of the nations considers just or at least just enough so that they do not feel that they can achieve their ends only by overthrowing it.

The great upheavals of our period have been caused because there have been countries which assaulted the international order as it then existed. And the great challenge of our time is to build a peace in which the majority of nations will have a sense of participating.

This is why I have greatly welcomed the efforts made here in this city, that have taken the form of a declaration of interdependence, because interdependence is the cardinal fact of our period and is one of the novel features of our period.

And as Americans, we are living for the first time since our early days under conditions in which we do not have overwhelming power. Our influence for good or ill is decisive for security and for progress. But we can no longer overwhelm our problems with resources. We no longer have the margin of safety that permitted us to wait until threats became overwhelming before we reacted, or that enabled us to solve the economic problems of a continent as we did at the time of the Marshall Plan with unilateral American decisions.

So much more depends on our understanding and on our sophistication and on our public support than ever before in our history.

And this means that we have to face one of the fundamental problems of statesmanship, which is that when the scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action is at a minimum. When your knowledge is greatest, the scope for action has very often disappeared.

In 1936, it would have been very simple to deal with the threat represented by Hitler. But the world would still be debating today whether Hitler was a misunderstood nationalist or a maniac bent on world domination.

By 1941, everybody knew that he was a maniac bent on world domination. But it was a knowledge acquired at the price of tens of millions of lives, and, therefore, we have to face the fact that our most important actions have to be based on assessments that cannot be proved true when they are made. And foreign policy therefore requires a greater degree of public understanding and a greater degree of support than has ever been the case in our history.

Now, I think it would be better to respond to specifics of our foreign policy in the form of answers to questions. But it is important to keep in mind the permanent goals of American foreign policy -- for peace, for progress, for justice, for international order, for relating these scores of new nations that have come into being to a new system, for strengthening our ties with our traditional friends, and for bringing about a safer and progressive world than the one we found.

And with this, I will be glad to answer questions.

MR. BODINE: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We will start off with Creed Black.

MR. BLACK: Mr. Secretary, as the first media representative speaking, I suppose I should join in the welcome. You certainly have made our lives more interesting over the last eight years. And I would ask you to extend our special regards to that highly placed source that usually travels with you. If he isn't with you tonight, we will tell him how helpful he has been. (Laughter)

It is true, as you say, that in the last years there have been some dramatic changes in our policy. And you have, despite what you say about the formation of foreign policy, been the architect of many of these changes.

In Kansas City, a couple of weeks ago, the Republican Party adopted an amendment to the foreign policy plank which was generally regarded as a repudiation of many of these policies.

One of our Washington colleagues just this very morning, who I think is very well informed, that is, Marquis Childs, wrote a column in which he quoted one of your associates as saying that, just as you left for Kansas City, you described this as the most searing experience of your life.

I wonder if you could tell us if that is an accurate description of your reaction to the action of your own party in Kansas City?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You know, one of the attributes of high office is that none of one's associates is ever willing to admit that he doesn't know what he is talking about. (Laughter)

The so-called morality plank in the Republican platform has to be seen in terms of the internal maneuvering of the Republican Party of the Convention, and not as an expression of well-considered substantive sentiment.

There was an intention to force a fight between the Ford camp and the Reagan camp, after the Ford camp had won the Rule 16c.

President Ford and his associates decided, in my view wisely, not to fight on a plank which in itself was really quite unexceptionable.

The phrases in that plank can be subscribed to by anybody, including myself, by about 90 percent. To be sure, we are not children, and we know that the few words were put in there in order to result in some needling.

But if you say, should we make unilateral concessions, nobody can say we were making unilateral concessions. And the basic principles that were stated there are principles that I don't object to -- in fact, that I subscribe to. And the maneuvering with respect to that platform

had much more to do with lining up delegates for the final nominating vote than with the substance of the foreign policy. And I stayed out of it. And I consider that the decisions of that week were not decisions in which I should get myself involved.

MR. STONE: Mr. Secretary, in your public utterances, you have consistently drawn a moral distinction between Rhodesia and Namibia, on the one hand, and South Africa on the other. For example, in a speech at noon today before the OIC, you said, "The white populations of Rhodesia and Namibia must recognize that majority rule is inevitable." And one of my colleagues from the Inquirer suggested you deliberately omitted South Africa.

Later in the speech, you said, "Unlike Rhodesia and Namibia, South Africa cannot be regarded as an illegitimate government."

Do you think that black Africa's leaders and South Africa's disenfranchised blacks agree with your assessment of South Africa as a legitimate government?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that most of black Africa's leaders -- and I would say all of the ones that I know -- would agree that there's a big difference between South Africa and Namibia and Rhodesia.

They consider Namibia and Rhodesia a colonial structure. They consider South Africa an African government that has an unjust domestic structure that must be changed.

But they are not talking about expelling the white population from South Africa. And, therefore, I would think that the problem of South Africa is a different problem from the problem of Namibia and Rhodesia, even though in my speech this afternoon I also condemned the practices of the South African Government with respect to its domestic legislation.

MR. STONE: Would you (inaudible) say that majority rule in inevitable in South Africa?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would believe that the practice of apartheid must end.

MR. STONE: I didn't ask that question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that majority rule must also come to South Africa. But I would say the way of achieving it is a different way than the way in Namibia and Rhodesia.

MS. SAVITCH: Mr. Secretary, getting back to Mr. Black's question on qhat happened in Kansas city. During the Nixon years, it seems as though you acted as a personal emissary to the President, while in the Ford Administration it seems as though foreign policy is implemented on a much wider level.

What are your own future plans past January 26, or whenever Inauguration Day is?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, in the Nixon Administration, except for the last year, I was Assistant to the President. And through all of the Ford Administration, I have been Secretary of State. And those are two different functions.

As Assistant to the President, you act primarily as an extension to the President. As the Secretary of State, you have to conduct the foreign policy of the United States through a well-established apparatus.

As far as my own personal plans are concerned, I am constantly asked that question. I believe it is important to keep in mind that we have to conduct foreign policy, even during this election, in a rather dangerous and complicated period. And I don't want to add any more uncertainty to it.

I have said repeatedly that after President Ford is re-elected is the time to discuss this, and that it would be presumptuous for me to say now what I will do.

MS. SAVITCH: Has it hurt us diplomatically, or has it hurt you as a diplomatic negotiator, and has anyone perceived you as possibly being a lame-duck negotiator?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, as you know, it is not always easy to get a word in edgewise with me, so I am not absolutely sure how people have reacted to me. (Laughter)

An election year in the United States is often unsettling to foreign nations because they hear very many extreme statements that are being made by various candidates.

The impression is always created that everything that has been done is a disaster and that everything that will come after will be a radical change.

And while foreign nations are becoming more sophisticated about the exuberance of our rhetoric, it nevertheless tends to create a period of some uncertainty.

I must say that on the major issues with which I have dealt, I have not found that the election year has significantly affected our foreign policy, but it does tend to produce a certain slowdown in the conduct of some of the issues.

MR. MCULLOUGH: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the need for public support of foreign policy, and I take that to mean a foreign policy with which the people feel comfortable. I like to talk for a moment about Korea and the fact that --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: About what --

MR. MCULLOUCH: About Korea. Even during the midst of the crisis on the truce line, the Government of South Korea has imprisoned 18 quite respected dissenters. Some of the people were formerly in the government there. Some were clergy, others teachers. And it seems to some

of us that the Government of South Korea is not above using the tragic death of the two American officers to bring the United States into even closer support of the regime there.

And my questions -- two of them -- do you feel comfortable about the level of civil liberties in the Republic of South Korea? And if not, is there anything we in the United States can do about it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There are several aspects to this problem. One is, do we feel comfortable about the level of civil liberties in South Sorea? The answer is, no; South Korea does not have standards of human rights comparable to our own. And only this Monday we presented a formal note to the Korean Government expressing our view on this matter.

Secondly, we are not in Korea because of the practices of the Korean Government but because of the importance that Korea has for the stability of Northeast Asia. And we believe that if the communists, if they were to take over South Korea -- as did several Presidents did before this Administration -- this would have an enormously unsettling effect on the stability of Northeast Asia, particularly of Japan.

Therefore, we have to balance our security necessities against some of the feelings with respect to certain governmental practices. And we are trying to do our best to improve those practices.

But, at the same time, we have an important commitment, not only legally but strategically, to the security of Northeast Asia that impels certain actions on our part.

MR. BLACK: Mr. Secretary, I would like to get back to this question of the continuity of our foreign policy and the public understanding of it, because one of the problems, it seems to me, is that many differences are too often too subtle and too sophisticated to be understood by the public.

We are now in this election compaign, and Mr.Carter is being briefed by a number of people trooping down to Plains, Georgia, who have been critics of your foreign policy -- George Ball, Zbiganiew Brzezinski, and others.

Surely there must be some differences between the policies of the two parties.

I wonder if you could explain to us what differences you see, as you understand Mr. Carter's foreign policy.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course, I basically believe that the political defense of our defense of our foreign policy is not the primary responsibility of the Secretary of State; and therefore, I don't volunteer comments like this. But to answer your question, first of all I would have to say that the formal statements of Governor Carter have not been characterized by excessive precision. (Laughter)

MR. BLACK: Perhaps they will be now.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So, it isn't easy, as I said, to get a hold of them.

Now, in answers to questions, he has indicated some directions with which we would strongly disagree. He has indicated, for example, that he would save $7 million from the Defense budget by bringing home troops from abroad.

Now you can't save those $7 million by bringing home troops from abroad unless you also disband them, because they cost as much in the United States as they do abroad. So that would have to mean an objective reduction in our strength.

We have a disagreement as to his assessment about the American reaction to communist parties coming to power in West European governments, though I seem to have detected a certain evolution in his position.

We disagree with respect to military assistance for South African countries as Kenya and Zaire. And we disagree with respect to his view about some aspects of the role of covert intelligence.

I am sure that as the campaign develops, other disagreements will emerge. But these, from the record that now exists, are some of the important disagreements.

We have also conducted -- he seems to imply that the Middle East should be settled by a prior agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, which afterwards is presented to the parties. Our view is that the negotiations in the Middle East should be conducted by the parties, with some assistance from the United States, though, if there is a final settlement, the Soviet Union can participate in guaranteeing it.

These are some of the differences that I see now.

MR. STONE: Mr. Secretary, your Department estimated that in the last three years, you made approximately thirty heartland speeches around the country.

This month was sort of a record. In your Administration, like Jimmy Carter, you were born again and you addressed two black groups for the first time, in one month -- the Urban League on August 2nd and today the OIC.

Traditionally, black communities have been very weak in its impact and influence on foreign policy; it's had very little involvement. This audience is a good example -- there are only three or four blacks here tonight.

What do you expect to gain by talking to black groups who have so little influence at the higher councils of policy, of which you have been a part in denying them in your three years as Secretary of State?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, I didn't solicit these invitations.

MR. STONE: The OIC said you did.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is absolutely incorrect.

Dr. Sullivan came to my office -- first of all, he wrote me a letter and then he invited me to speak there. And I have not solicited either invitation. But I thought it was important to explain to these audiences what our policy with respect to Africa was.

Now, I have, in fact, had the practice to meet with the Black Caucus from the early days of my incumbency in Washington. And I believe I am the first Secretary of State who has done so.

My basic responsibility is to create understanding for our foreign policy, and to get as much advice from leaders of various groups as I can.

The purpose of these visits is not political, because all of the experts have a pretty good estimate as to what the likely voting line-up is going to be in the various communities.

But I believe that it is important, as long as we are engaged on a major new initiative in Africa, that we get the views of the black leaders and that we convey our thinking to black audiences.

As I said, I was meeting with the Black Caucus even at the time when we thought the opportunities for American initiatives in Africa did not yet exist over the last two years.

MS. SAVITCH: It has come to my attention that the Rand Corporation recently completed a study for the State Department on terrorism and that between 1965 and the present there have been almost 1,000 terrorist acts recorded.

Now, we in the media are constatnly being criticized in that if we cover these terroristic events, we are somehow promoting them. If we do not, we are censoring, and it is a news black-out.

Is the State Department in much the same postiion, untenable position? In other words, if you ignore terrorist acts, you are knucking under; if you use force, you can escalate to larger armed confrontation.

What is your policy going to be with regard to terrorism?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The problem of terrosim is novel in international diplomacy. And there aren't really any good rules, and there may not be any rules unless we can get an international convention that bans terrorism and in which all the nations agree that nobody will give any assistance to terrorists, no matter what they think of their political views.

We believe that the use of innocent people for political purposes which they cannot effect, and in decisions in which they have no part, is unconscionable. (Applause)

Now, the problem of terrorism reaches the Department of State when

American citizens are kidnapped or most frequently when American officials are kidnapped, and when we have been asked to negotiate with the terrorists.

We have adopted the painful and difficult policy of refusing all negotiations with terrorists. The reason we do this is because no matter how successful any one negotiation may be, there are so many Americans spread all over the world that once it is known that the United States is prepared to negotiate, then all Americans will be continually in jeopardy.

As long as terrorists know that American Ambassadors have no authority, or no hope of any authority, for negotiating about terrorist acts, there is at least a lowered incentive.

Now, in any one case, it produces the most anguishing decision for us.

I must say that this policy of not negotiating has worked in a number of cases. For example, there were a number of Americans that had been kidnapped in Eritrea. There were several attempts to contact us and to negotiate with us. We refused all substantive negotiations. And after several months, these kidnapped Americans were released.

It doesn't always work, but often nothing works in these cases.

We believe that is is the best policy, the one that will save most lives and that will protect most Americans abroad. However, we believe that the ultimate solution must be an international convention in which all nations pledge themselves to give no assistance of any kind to terrorists, and in which those nations which refuse to join are ostracized from international air service and other measures. And we are going to push this strongly at the General Assembly at the United Nations. (Applause)

MR. MCULLOUCH: Mr. Secretary, many of the individuals in your audience tonight are people in business, and some have spoken out in support of a proposal apparently gaining support in Cognress that would block the cooperation by US business in the Arab League boycott against Israel.

Senator Ribicoff sponsored it and said this is the only realistic way of dealing with what he thinks is an illegal and immoral type of economic warfare.

Secretary Simon, who I think is the last member of the Cabinet to speak out on this, said that such a law would make matters worse and would harden Arab attitudes.

I wonder if you would talk about that tonight and give us your view on it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not willingly. (Laughter) Can I talk about it on November 3rd? (Laughter)

Now that you have asked me -- and I wish that the Chairman had stopped before this -- I agree with Secretary Simon. I am against a boycott. I think it is wrong for American firms to participate in it. I also believe that we have important interests in some of the countries concerned. Saudi Arabia can have a major inpact on the oil prices, which in turn can have a major impact on developing of the American economy.

Many of these countries are needed for progress toward peace in the Middle East. We belive that the way to deal with the boycott is through the Executive Orders and through the actions of the Attorney General that the Administration has already done. And we are afraid that some of the legislation that is now being considered is going to produce confrontations and disadvantages from which everybody will suffer.

And therefore I support Secretary Simon's opposition to this amendment. (Applause)

MR. BODINE: Thank you, panelists, very much indeed.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, we would like to give an opportunity to those on the ballroom floor who wish to question the Secretary.

Will those of you who have questions, which have been returned, be kind enough to go two or three at a time to each of the two standing mikes -- I can see one mike; I am told there is another there; I am blinded a bit from it right now -- and there to ask your question in a voice sufficiently loud for all to hear, so that it need not be repeated.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But not intimidating. (Laughter)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, keeping in mind that in 1956 we had the Hungary crisis and in 1968 the Czechoslovakia business took place, predominately during the National Democratic Convention week, my question to you is this: Is there any evidence that either the Soviet Union or the Republic of China has a preference as to which candidate wins this year? And if so, do you expect either to manipulate a crisis to help effect that end?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, neither of the two countries has as yet communicated its preference. (Laughter) And I am not absolutely sure that I would know how it would come.

But I think it is exaggerated to believe that in 1956 and in 1968, the Soviet Union organized these actions in order to affect our political campaign.

It happened that there were uprisings in both Czechoslovakia and Hungary that the Soviet Union considered incompatible with the stability of its own domestic structure.

But, to answer your question, it is probably true that most foreign governments always prefer the Administration in office because they know it, they have worked with it, and they know what to expect. And that would be generally the case.

I don't know whether that is the case with respect to the Soviet Union and the People's Reoublic of China.

I think that any country would make a major mistake to create a crisis in order to affect our national election, because I am confident that there would be united support for the policy of the Administration on a non-partisan basis in resisting foreign pressures. (Applause)

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, with respect to the Law of the Sea Conference now going on in New York, what can the United States do to redirect some of the efforts of the non-aligned countries that are restricting progress in Committee One negotiations with respect to the deep seabed resources?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am goind, in fact, from here to New York in order to see whether we can bring about more rapid progress on the Law of the Sea negotiations.

The Law of the Sea negotiations now is organized in three major committees.

The first committee deals with the deep seabeds. The second committee deals with the so-called economic zone; that is, the exploitation of the 200 mile zone off the coast. And the third deals with scientific research.

With respect to Committees Two and Three, while they are still unsolved issues, I am reasonably optimistic that, by the end of the conference in two and a half weeks, substantial agreement will have been reached.

With respect to the Committee One on the deep seabeds, progress has been less rapid.

The deep seabeds have a great deal of mineral wealth. The United States, at this moment, is probably the only country with the technology to mine thiswealth, although over a period, but even the United States cannot really begin operating before 1983 and 1984, in that time frame.

By the end of the 1980's, many other countries will be in a position to do so.

So the problem is to create a regime for the deep seabeds in which business can operate in a legal framework and in which we avoid on the oceans the sort of colonial rivalry or the sort of rivalry that led to colonial disputes in the 19th century.

Some of the disagreements in Committee One have to do with the intrinsic difficulty of the subject. And we will make some proposals tomorrow and the next day that we hope will break some of the deadlocks.

Other difficulties are caused, as you correctly pointed out in your question, by the attitudes of some of the radical, non-aligned countries that are trying to put all of the deep seabeds under international control, which would mean that our exploration would be the subject of majorities in which we have no decisive influence, even though we are the only country that has the capacity to engage in this mining.

That proposition we cannot and will not accept.

We are prepared to divide the exploration of the oceans between an area that is generally available for private enterprise and an area that is generally available for international enterprise.

The problem now will be, how to find the means to regulate this. And I am going up there for the next two days in the hope of making some progress by making some

have been made. But the extreme demands, we cannot possibly meet.

And therefore, if no agreement is reached, we will have to proceed unilaterally, reluctant as we are to do that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, some observers have remarked that you personalized the position of the Secretary of State. Would you care to comment on the extent to which you feel your personality has influenced the course of international events during your tenure?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, you know, many of my associates will tell you that humility is one of my most outstanding traits. (Laughter)

I don't think I am the best judge of the degree to which my personality influences foreign policy. I think my father could give you a much more objective opinion on the subject. (Laughter)

But I was in office during a period when a number of dramatic initiatives took place, with some of which I was associated.

The secret trip to China, the secret negotiations with the Vietnamese, the beginning of negotiations with other countries, the breakthroughs in the Middle East -- all of them lent themselves to a series of dramatic events.

And then during the period of Watergate, more attention focused on the Secretary of State than would normally be the case, regardless of the qualities of the Secretary of State.

I believe that in general, foreign policy -- the reason these dramatic events took place was because of the revolutionary changes in the international environment that I described in the beginning. But it would be a mistake to believe that this sort of event can happen regularly or can be the normal style of foreign policy.

It was a combination of circumstances, both international and domestic.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the United States is now the greatest supplier of arms in the world. The last figure I read was some 136 nations.

What concerns me is the amount and the sophistication of arms being sold to countries in the Middle East, especially to Iran.

With billions of arms going to Iran, some 26,000 technicians there, I understand, are we not creating a hostage in that country? What would happen, for instance, if Iran went to war with any nation? Would we not then be very much involved? Would you be good enough to comment on this?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, let me do it in two parts.

First, the general problem of the arms sales -- and there the growing resources of many countries to buy arms, coupled with the competition between various countries, does create a problem. And we are setting up machinery which we hope to announce within the next few weeks to have a more systematic review of various arms requests than has always been possible.

At the same time, the case of Iran is not the best case for your argument, if I may say so.

Iran is a country whose independence has been considered important to the United States since the days that President Truman warned the Soviet Union about its occupation of Azerbaijan.

Iran is one of the larger oil producers in the Middle East. It has pursued a foreign policy very parallel to our own. It has not joined any embargo. It has never used its weapons for any purposes of which we did not approve. It has never threatened to use its weapons for any purposes of which we did not approve. It has never transferred its weapons to any other country, much less to any country of which we didn't approve.

It is threatened by the Soviet Union to the north. It has as its neighbor Iraq, which is one of the most radical Arab states and which in relation to per capita is armed much more extensively by the Soviet Union than we are arming Iran.

So, I would believe that Iran's willingness to defend itself, and to defend itself by paying cash for its arms, is a positive development.

Now, as for the American in Iran: I have read this figure of 23,000 Americans that are in Iran. But it is important to break down the figure.

Of these 23,000 Americans, 1,000 are in the military advisory group; 3,000 are with defense-related activities -- that is, they are advisers for equipment which we have sold to Iran and in which they are training Iranians, and they will leave within a period of one or two years -- 7,000, no, 5,000 are connected with the oil industry; 2,000 are connected with other private enterprise; and the rest are dependents.

So, even if you took out all the Americans connected with military activities, you still would have some 15,000 Americans in Iran. And if we therefore advanced the proposition that we cannot have Americans in any country abroad because it would be too risky, then we will finally wind up with having no Americans in any country but also no influence in any country, and with a severe undermining of our economy.

In general, I recognize the concern about arms sales. But one has to keep in mind also that some countries -- for example, there are countries in Latin America, which for diplomatic reasons I do not wish to mention -- that were denied arms by the United States many years ago with the argument that they should put their resources into economic development. They then put their resources into Soviet arms. And now the Soviet Union has a military establishment in those countries, or at least has trainers in those countries in a greater degree than they otherwise would have had.

So, nobody is pursuing a policy of selling arms for their own sake, but especially in the case of Iran -- a country, I repeat, that did not join the embargo; that is selling oil to Israel; that has declared that it will not join any other embargo; and that has been a great friend and supporter of the United States on almost all objectives of foreign policy.

I think it is, on the whole, in the American interest to enable it to defend itself. All the more so as it is done entirely with its own resources. (Applause)

MR. BODINE: Thank you, very much, Mr. Secretary.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have made a commitment to the Secretary to adjourn at approximately 9:15 so he can get his flight to New York where he has additional meetings this evening -- if you can believe it.

May we have therefore one more question, and maybe we can go to the mike over here.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Taiwan -- are we progressing towards a solution?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I didn't hear you.

QUESTION: Taiwan. In light of the Shanghai memorandum, are we progressing towards a solution?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Shanghai Communique states as an objective the normalization of relations. The United States stated that we believe -- we also stated that the Chinese on both sides of the China straits assert that there is only one China, and we do not contest that proposition.

We differed with the People's Republic of China on the method in which the one China should be achieved. And we stated in the Shanghai Communique that the United States believed that the methods should be peaceful.

We are prepared to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China. We have not, however, up to now, been able to agree on the modalities by which this should be achieved, and therefore this is a matter that is still open.

MR. BODINE: Members of the panel, we thank you very much, indeed; the dinner guests, we most appreciate your willingness to come. We are terribly sorry that we must terminate this. And most particularly, our profound gratitude to the Secretary for his time, his patience, and his most able leadership. (Applause)

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